PREFACE
The many political paradoxes of strategic airpower have always fascinated me. While airpower's vision has often exceeded its strategic reach, the exponential gains we have made in targeting and precision delivery of weapons may usher a new age of less costly warfare. Unmanned vehicles, despite the ethical challenge they present, offer to take warfare even further. Yet all of this technology cannot be evaluated in isolation of the political impacts. This paper makes an attempt to balance the claims of airpower against its political limitations. Airpower, like any means, cannot be separated from the objective it serves. Therefore an evaluation of airpower must be in light of its interaction with politics at the strategic level.
I would like to express thanks to my family, particularly Miss Lisa for her support during this effort. My advisor, Col Gary Snyder, has also been a great friend and supporter. Thanks also to the US Air Force and Army for providing this unique opportunity to spend a year in the study of history, strategy and national policy.
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ON POLITICS AND AIRPOWER
THE POLITICAL PROMISE OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER
The political object -the original motive for the war -will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires." -Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Chapter 1
Airpower advocates are staunch in their defense of airpower as the new form of warfare.
The deadly combination of US dominance in reconnaissance platforms, stealthy precision strike systems and real time information systems make possible the near-real-time targeting and allweather destruction of targets undreamed of during the Gulf War. They argue that yet another Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has occurred and that has redefined warfare in the 21 st century. Yet, as Clausewitz points out, it is the political object that is dominant in any consideration of utility. To consider airpower's incredible technical or military achievement in isolation from the political objective is foolishness. The claims must be evaluated in the light of their contribution to the overall political object and political utility. Airpower is therefore nothing more than a relatively new means to achieve the political objective. The decision to use airpower either alone or in combination with other means is a strategic choice. While military commanders might make this strategic choice alone, history has shown us that the strategic employment and limitation of airpower is often made at the political level. This section introduces the major claims of airpower's advantages from a political perspective. Later sections will place these claims under the harsh light of reality and explore the unstated political limitations of modern airpower. The final section will examine the politics of airpower in the major conflicts since World War II and present some lessons we can draw for the modern form of warfare.
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE
The combination of American precision airpower and information dominance has been hailed as the modern form of asymmetric warfare, leveraging technological superiority to achieve unprecedented military victory. The lethal combination of stealth, precision strike, satellite and airborne reconnaissance potentially allows any fixed surface target on the planet to be targeted and destroyed in a matter of hours. This uniquely American asymmetry provides such a dominant US advantage that it effectively serves as deterrence to potential enemies who might threaten US interests abroad. Air Force historian Richard Hallion calls airpower "the Western world's asymmetric offset against opponents who are compelled by doctrinal choice, economic necessity, or the realities of technological circumstances to rely upon older and less relevant forms of warfare."
1 Some, including General Butler, former Strategic Air Command commander and General Horner, the air commander during the Gulf War believe that the US advantage as so large as to propose dismantling of US nuclear forces, arguing that conventional air forces can create near-nuclear effects at less cost and with less potential for an accident. 2 Politically, the US has been able to leverage the threat of US airpower credibly to deter and even coerce foes in a variety of situations. For example, the threat of airpower played a major role in convincing Milosevic to agree to the Dayton Accords.
PRECISE POLITICAL CONTROL
Airpower advocates shiver at the thought of direct political control, which brings up vivid memories of President Johnson selecting individual targets and routes to be struck at his "Tuesday luncheons" during the Vietnam war. 3 Nevertheless, the susceptibility of modern airpower to political micromanagement is a significant advantage to political leaders. Airpower is centrally planned. Political leaders can centrally control classes of targets and even select individual targets tailored to limited objectives. In addition, the tempo, timing and pace of air strikes can be tightly controlled to support strategic goals. Given sufficient resources, one can increase the intensity of air strikes at will, or cut them off entirely at a moment's notice. Ground forces do not provide the same degree of direct centralized control or the ability to disengage immediately once engaged. Since airpower can be redirected at a moment's notice directly from Washington, it is possible to use airpower in areas where objectives are limited, and means must similarly be limited. This allows airpower to be flexibly applied across the full spectrum of geopolitical operations, especially where peripheral interests may not warrant the deployment of US ground forces.
FEWER CASUALTIES
Employing airpower inherently places fewer friendly forces at risk than employing conventional ground forces. A large air operation might place a few hundred airman at risk at any one time, while deploying a single army brigade potentially places thousands at risk. US technological dominance in the air further reduces this risk. As proof, both the Kosovo and initial Afghanistani campaigns are cited since no US airman lost their lives to enemy fire. In addition, airpower advocates make the claim that modern airpower results in fewer enemy civilian casualties because military targets can be directly struck with precision weapons that limit collateral damage. In contrast, a conventional ground force must defeat intervening enemy ground forces and occupy civilian territories to destroy these same strategic targets, potentially at higher cost to the local civilian populace. Limiting friendly casualties clearly limits the domestic political cost of military action, while reducing collateral damage to the enemy provides political advantages both at home and abroad.
DIRECT ATTACK ON THE ENEMY'S WILL
Early airpower advocates such as Giulio Douhet, writing in the aftermath of the horrific First World War, proposed using the third dimension not to attack enemy fielded forces, but to bypass them and strike directly at the enemy's will. 4 The promise of airpower is to avoid a war of attrition by striking directly at the enemy's heart, or main center of gravity. Which targets comprise the center of gravity is a matter of considerable debate to this day, and will be explored more fully in this paper. Nevertheless, airpower offers an alternative to previous forms of warfare by allowing us to strike at the enemy homeland without first destroying intervening armies. As Clausewitz notes, "…three broad objectives which between them cover everything.
They are the military power, the country and the will of the enemy." 5 Airpower can strike at all three simultaneously and immediately. From a political perspective, the enemy's war making capability and leadership can be directly struck from the very beginning of the war, creating immediate danger and political pressure on a state's leaders to erode their will.
POWER PROJECTION
Modern airpower represents the most rapid and lethal means for projecting US power globally. Whether it is a B-2 operating directly from Whiteman AFB in Missouri, or Tomahawk Land Attack cruise missiles and aviation from a carrier battle group, the US uniquely possesses the ability to rapidly project overwhelming airpower to any regional conflict. The fact that substantial land or sea-based airpower can be projected worldwide more rapidly than conventional ground forces is a significant strategic advantage for the United States. In addition to the deterrence value, rapid power projection allows limited US air forces to flexibly respond to developing political situations. The ability to project airpower globally is a unique capability of the United States, and therefore provides a unique geopolitical and strategic advantage to US forces.
STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY
The ability of airpower to be reconfigured for many different kinds of missions and rapidly projected worldwide provides tremendous strategic flexibility. The same command and control plane that is monitoring drug missions in the Caribbean one day can be used a day or two later to direct fighters in combat. Transports can be used to haul precision weapons to one location and humanitarian aid to the next. Politically this gives the President and Secretary of Defense a tremendous menu of strategic options to select from and allows the US to engage in a full spectrum of operations worldwide to enhance and protect US interests.
INFORMATION DOMINANCE
Air and Space reconnaissance platforms create a unique worldwide capability to monitor and intercept enemy deployments, movements, communications, and assess intent. In addition, the tremendous integration of these platforms with US command and control systems that has taken place since Desert Storm now allow near real-time identification and targeting of the enemy. The Open Skies treaty allows overhead systems to monitor territory that is inaccessible using other platforms. From a political perspective, the unique intelligence gathering capabilities provided by US assets provide both a peacetime and wartime advantage by increasing worldwide situational awareness and in many cases intercepting the movements and intent of the enemy before a crisis develops. The recent integration of special operations forces and CIA operatives publicized in Afghanistan provide complimentary information to enhance that gathered by air and space assets. Politically this can provide a huge advantage in negotiations, and peacetime engagement as well as military operations.
RAPID VICTORY
US airpower is an asymmetric worldwide strategically flexible force that can attack directly at the enemy's centers of gravity with minimal friendly casualties. The sum of these effects, airmen claim, is a more rapid victory than is possible using conventional forces alone. While most theorists discount the idea that airpower should ever be used alone as it was in Kosovo, many believe that the exponential growth in technical capability and capacity of US airpower reduces the role of conventional ground forces in future conflict. Applying airpower for strategic objectives decisively from the outset of a conflict will result in a short conflict with relatively few friendly casualties. Politically, a short conflict is desirable domestically, particularly in a democracy where public will must be maintained. Similarly a short war is more acceptable in the international arena where allies and coalition partners must be retained.
SUMMARY
It is clear to see why airpower offers a politically attractive alternative to conventional force. The promise of few casualties, worldwide mobility, rapid victory, precise political control, and the asymmetric US technological advantage appear to make airpower the weapon of choice as we begin a new century. One might conclude as President Johnson did that airpower is an awesome weapon that must be tightly controlled lest it spark World War III. One might be led, as some political leaders were during the Kosovo campaign, to believe that airpower alone can win any conflict. Yet airpower does not come without strings attached. In the next two sections we will examine the basic theory of airpower and some of its limitations in an attempt to determine some of the strengths and limits of airpower application.
AIRPOWER UBER ALLES -THE AIRMAN'S PERSPECTIVE
The colossal maneuvers of the coalition armies in the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq in 1991 may in retrospect appear, like the final charges of cavalry in the nineteenth, an anomaly in the face of modern firepower.
-Eliot Cohen
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Some believe we have entered an era of Airpower Uber Alles -"airpower above all."
Airpower advocates provide much promise to the political leader, but to deliver on these promises they also believe airpower must be employed in a certain way. It is not enough to merely select targets and bomb them. The tenants of the airman prescribe how airpower should be employed, how targets should be chosen and who should be in control of aerospace assets.
While the airman's doctrine is concerned with details primarily at the operational level, their implementation has strategic and geopolitical implications. As we will see in the fourth section it is primarily this conflict between the operational doctrine and politics that fuels the fire between airmen and their political leaders. It is important, therefore, to provide an overview of the fundamental tenants of airpower employment from an airman's perspective before examining the limitations of strategic airpower employment. The ten prepositions below are summaries of Meilinger's Ten Propositions Regarding Airpower, which provides one of the best concise overviews of modern air doctrine.
7
AIRPOWER IS INHERENTLY A STRATEGIC FORCE
One of the most controversial tenants of airpower is the airman's belief in the primacy of the strategic, rather than tactical employment of airpower. Airmen argue that airpower, by exploiting the third dimension, effectively compresses the lines between strategic and tactical operations. One no longer needs to defeat an intervening army to attack the enemy capital or destroy his factories. One can strike directly at the will and capability to make war. In the extreme, airmen argue that strikes against most tactical targets such as fielded enemy forces is a waste of airpower because it dilutes the focus on key centers of gravity. Airpower should be used to attack tactical targets only to the degree that they directly support a strategic center of gravity.
In contrast, Clausewitz argues that "…to overcome the enemy, or disarm him-call it what you will-must always be the aim of warfare." 8 He further says that the most important act for defeating the enemy is "1. Destruction of his army, if it is at all significant." 9 In Clausewitz's time, the enemy army was the center of gravity, the defeat of which ultimately resulted in total victory. Soldiers argue, therefore, that airpower should be used as another form of fire in support of tactical forces engaging the enemy army. The conflict between the airman's perspective and soldier's perspective over the amount of airpower to be devoted to tactical versus strategic targets is a source of constant tension that is frequently misinterpreted by political leadership.
AIRPOWER IS TARGETING, AND TARGETING IS INTELLIGENCE
If airpower possesses the potential to destroy any unburied target, the dilemma of airpower employment becomes a simple question of which targets to destroy and in which order. Since airpower is finite, targets must be prioritized and assigned to ultimately achieve the desired political objectives, and not to merely wreak destruction. This depends upon accurate and timely intelligence of large enemy systems as well as the individual targets within them.
Both the importance of a target in the scheme of the military objective must be known as well as its vulnerability to air attack. Finally, intelligence must be available to accurately gauge the effects of an attack on the whole system. Without accurate intelligence one of the following will happen: the wrong target may be selected, the target struck may have no relation to the objectives of the campaign, or the right target might be struck, but damage assessed incorrectly, leaving an operational enemy. As a result, the US Air Force has invested heavily not only in reconnaissance platforms, but also the information systems needed to process and disseminate intelligence to the warfighter. While substantial strides have been made in gathering and distributing targeting intelligence in the last 10 years, assessing the real effects of air operations in terms of enemy capability and will still remains an art form.
In addition, the direct tie from tactical targets struck to meeting real strategic objectives can often be subjective and circuitous. This critical realization has led to a modification of The tremendous psychological impact of these precisely timed yet unwarned attacks can be overwhelming. The ability of airpower to operate with great speed and surprise over at any point at any time over the battlefield can sometimes substitute for mass. If force can be unexpectedly applied at precisely the right place and moment with complete surprise it can often overwhelm an unprepared foe. As airpower legend John Boyd said in his unpublished but widely circulated theory, the goal is to get inside an enemy's OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop by observing, deciding and acting faster than the enemy can react to create a crushing psychological strain on the enemy mind. The goal is to overcome the will to fight by dominating time. Airmen will therefore seek to create an extremely rapid, high tempo air operation that masses effects in time as well as space for maximal erosion of the enemy's will.
AIRPOWER CAN CONDUCT OPERATIONS AT ALL LEVELS OF WAR SIMULTANEOUSLY
The inherent flexibility of airpower allows it to be used for a variety of missions simultaneously including air superiority, strategic attack, interdiction, close air support and many others. Airpower can conduct these missions simultaneously across the entire spectrum of a conflict as long as air superiority is established over the operating area. Airpower, unlike ground forces, need not engage in a counterforce battle as a prerequisite to strategic attack. This simultaneous, or parallel attack can create parallel effects, leaving the enemy with multiple crises to deal with. The goal of parallel attack is to create strategic paralysis wherein an enemy faced with simultaneous breakdowns at the strategic, operational and tactical level loses its effectiveness and ceases to operate as a coherent force. Given sufficient airpower and targeting carefully designed to create certain effects, it is theoretically possible to create total strategic paralysis, effectively breaking an enemy's will to fight. Airmen will seek to simultaneously strike key strategic, operational and tactical targets in the hope that combined effects will create strategic paralysis in the enemy.
PRECISION AIR WEAPONS HAVE REDEFINED THE MEANING OF MASS
The concentration of force and fires to break through an enemy defense is called mass.
An inherent advantage of airpower is its ability to concentrate or mass on virtually any point in support of operational or tactical objectives. Unfortunately, airpower is a precious resource and early airpower required a substantial number of airplanes to destroy a single target with high probability and acceptable losses. The ability to mass was limited by lack of precision and capable enemy defenses. For example in World War II, to destroy a single small house with high probability required a force of 4500 medium bombers accounting for both the high loss rate and low precision. 
TECHNOLOGY AND AIRPOWER ARE INTEGRALLY AND SYNERGISTICALLY RELATED
Airpower has its roots in technology and depends more than other services on the synergistic relationship between the two. Technology to a very large degree determines the precision, effectiveness and survivability of air platforms. In the era of beyond visual range sensors and air weaponry technology's influence is preeminent. Considering the increases in technology since WWII with the introduction of space assets, precision weaponry, stealth, missiles, it is impossible to separate the development or employment of airpower from technology. The preeminence of the US Air Force is built largely on superior technology, and all US airmen have an interest in maintaining this technological edge.
AIRPOWER INCLUDES NOT ONLY MILITARY ASSETS BUT ROBUST CIVILIAN AVIATION
Airpower cannot be isolated to the military alone. Adhering to these propositions should result in success for the airman. Air theorists are quick to point out that places where airpower failed to achieve its objective, such as the Rolling
Thunder campaign in Vietnam, are marred by one or more violations of these propositions.
They are also quick to point to the politician, President Johnson in this case, as the source of failure. As we will see in the coming analysis, airpower theory, while it captures some of the inherent pitfalls in air employment, has some inherent assumptions that often go unwritten by leading theorists. Next we will examine some of the limits inherent in the practical employment of airpower.
THE LIMITS OF AIRPOWER
Bombing is often called 'strategic' when we hit the enemy, and 'tactical' when he hits us, and is often difficult to know where one finishes and the other begins.
-Air Vice-Marshal J. E. 'Johnnie' Johnson, RAF
THE TRUE MEASURE OF AIRPOWER
Airpower is only effective if it supports the political objectives of the state. As Clausewitz says "… it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us." 16 Airpower as a means cannot therefore be separated from its object. Alternatively, as Clodfelter puts it, "… the supreme test of bombing's efficacy is its contribution to the nation's war aims." 17 The effectiveness of airpower is therefore not measured in numbers of targets, tanks or buildings destroyed. Even the Air Force's concept of "Effects Based Operations" may miss the mark if the effects produced are not related to the object of bending enemy will. Creating "Strategic Paralysis" and getting inside the enemy's OODA loop may be insufficient if it does not compel an enemy to do our will. An air operation, whether done jointly or alone, can only be measured in terms of its contribution to the overall objective. Airpower must be directed at the enemy's will. Its effectiveness can only be evaluated by assessing airpower's contribution to achieving that objective. This is the political value of airpower that will form the basis for the analysis that follows.
In the same passage as the quote above, Clausewitz introduces a second and critical point: "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that a statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." 18 This concept will become central to the political analysis that follows. We will find that airpower most often reaches its limit as a means when it is applied to a type of war for which it is ill suited. Airpower is capable of many things, but airpower alone is no panacea. Just as individual instruments of power each have limits on the grand strategic level, airpower too has its limit at the strategic level. Airpower alone cannot achieve even many military objectives much less all political objectives. Airpower must be employed on the grand strategic level in combination with other forms of military, diplomatic and economic power.
POLITICAL LIMITS ON AIRPOWER
The "Airpower Uber Alles" doctrine previously discussed points to a critical limitation of airpower as a means. To be used "properly" airpower must be employed in certain ways.
Airpower must be employed strategically against enemy centers of gravity. It must be concentrated in space and time to produce psychological as well as physical shock. Airpower should not be employed by gradual escalation, but should be massed and used at all levels of war simultaneously to produce strategic paralysis. Airpower should be used offensively and not defensively. Airpower should be used to strike directly at the will of the enemy, and John
Warden points out that it should strike enemy leadership directly if possible
. 19 Yet what is the outcome if political objectives do not support the immediate overwhelming strategic application of airpower? As Clausewitz points out, "War is never an isolated act." 20 Political will and the political objective often work to limit war and carry it away from the extremes of the ideal case. The ease of target identification from the air is also critical for airpower. A conventional mechanized army is much more vulnerable to air attack than an unconventional guerilla army.
Vulnerability also plays a key role when we consider terrain. A dispersed enemy in difficult terrain may be nearly impossible to target solely from the air, while on open terrain he may be extremely vulnerable. The corollaries that can be derived from Builder's vulnerability theory are nearly endless, but they all focus on two key capabilities required for airpower: first, the ability or airpower identify a target and second the ability of airpower to destroy it. If both cannot be done reliably, then airpower cannot be effectively employed.
Applying this vulnerability theory to the failure of Vietnam, one readily arrives at the second major conclusion regarding Rolling Thunder. As introduced at the beginning of this section, Clausewitz says that the most far-reaching judgment to be made at the outset of a conflict is the nature of the war to be fought. In the Rolling Thunder period of 1965-1968, US forces were engaged primarily in a guerilla war against a limited number of Vietcong supported by North Vietnam. Not until the later Tet offensive did the nature of the war change to a more traditional conflict involving conventional North Vietnamese forces. Despite the fact that the Vietcong required meager supplies and had multiple routes to conduct their guerilla war, airpower was used in a tactical and interdiction role to attempt to intercept these supplies and bomb guerilla forces. A conventional air strategy was adopted against an agrarian and unconventional enemy. The enemy proved largely invulnerable to either strategy. It was not possible to interdict the small amount of ammunition and supplies that sustained the Vietcong.
Since the Vietcong were indistinguishable from the local population and engaged in hit and run tactics, it was also very difficult to effectively apply tactical airpower in all but the most limited of circumstances. In short, the enemy and his supply lines could not be reliably located or targeted, so airpower was an inappropriate means for this stage of the war. If we look at the recent example of Afghanistan, one might surmise that the Taliban government was politically vulnerable to US air attack. After a relatively short US air and special operations campaign, the Taliban government and forces collapsed overnight. Major
Taliban commanders and their forces switched sides in large numbers as they saw the political winds begin to change. Though the attacking coalition ground forces played a major role, it appears from initial reports that the Taliban capitulation was more of a political collapse than a military defeat. The Taliban were politically vulnerable to US attacks, resulting in a relatively quick US victory.
AIRPOWER LACKS PERSISTENCE
One of the truly innovative strategic thinkers in recent times is Archer Jones. Jones, a scholar of ancient warfare largely untrained in modern doctrine puts forth an interesting set of observations based on the breadth of history from ancient times to the present. 27 Jones argues that there are four fundamental strategies that have been pursued in all wars and that these four can be differentiated along two axes (Table 1) . First, Archer introduces what he calls a "raiding" strategy, where the basic objective is not to permanently occupy the enemy territory, but rather to temporarily enter enemy territory to achieve one's objective and then return to one's home when the raid is complete. The counter strategy is a "persistent" strategy where one aims to occupy enemy territory and either control it for a purpose or annex it. These two strategies form the first axis in Jones' matrix, and answer the "how" of the strategy. A strategy may either be raiding or persistent.
Persisting Raiding Combat
Persistent-Combat Raiding-Combat
Logistics Persistent-Logistics Raiding-Logistics to engage directly in a "combat" strategy aimed at destroying the enemy's force. The second option is to engage in a "logistic" strategy that is aimed at denying the enemy the means for war.
These correspond surprisingly well with Liddle-Hart's direct and indirect strategies from his book Strategy, 28 with the direct being combat and indirect being logistical. The cross of these two axes allows four fundamental grand strategies as shown in table Table 1 . For example, destroying an enemy army and permanently occupying its capital is a persistent-combat strategy, while a guerilla raid on an arms depot is a raiding-logistics strategy. Each strategy has advantages and disadvantages depending on the objective to be reached. Persistent strategies, for example, are strategically more decisive but also generally more costly than raiding strategies. Similarly, direct combat strategies are generally more costly than logistics strategies. Jones argues that histories greatest captains prefer the indirect logistics strategies to combat strategies primarily because they require less effort. The selection of strategy is determined by the strategic art that links the strategic objective to its means.
Airpower can engage in a policy of raiding but not persistence. Raiding and persistent strategies each have their strengths and weaknesses. While a raiding strategy such as airpower can freely destroy targets to attempt to persuade an enemy to take a certain action, it cannot control an enemy's future action. It can persuade an enemy, even decisively coerce or compel an enemy but it cannot permanently assure that the enemy will not alter his course in the future or engage again in undesirable action. The closest airpower can come to a persistent strategy is a strategy of "air occupation" where one attempts to approximate persistence by a series of raids. The limits of a non-persistent strategy are best described by Clausewitz, who states:
"If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of the situation must not be merely transient-at least not in appearance. Otherwise the enemy would not give in but wait for things to improve."
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The strategic employment of airpower is essentially a raiding-logistic strategy. Its aim is not to directly destroy enemy combat forces but to deny the enemy the means to fight. This strategy traces right back to the "industrial web" theory developed by the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) in the interwar years and follows through as an unbroken thread to today's airpower doctrine. 30 The goal is to create losses in industry, infrastructure and national command targets that are so damaging that continuing the conflict is futile. The limits of such a strategy are obvious. First, it does not destroy the enemy's combat forces, and therefore the enemy retains at least part of his capability to fight. Second, as noted above it is not a persistent strategy.
Interestingly a "raiding-logistics" strategy fits perfectly with US national strategy. First, it is an "economy of force" approach that is minimalist in nature. Raiding is inherently less costly in blood and treasure than persistent strategies, and indirect logistic strategies are also less costly than combat strategies. Using airpower before engaging in other forms of combat therefore minimizes the risk for US forces. This minimalist approach also reduces, though it does not eliminate, the need for a large standing army. The US has historically opposed a large standing army both on constitutional and economic grounds. Second, since US national strategy emphasizes the expansion of democracy and free markets rather than US territory, a raiding strategy prevents any misperception that US forces may persist. Through raiding, the US can engage an enemy for limited objectives where important US interests are not necessarily at stake. If a persistent strategy were used for these lower priority national interests, public sentiment might turn against action. Airpower, therefore, lowers the threshold of pain to give political leaders more freedom in engagement overseas.
POLITICS AND AIRPOWER IN PRACTICE
When my brother and I built the first man-carrying flying machine, we thought that we were introducing into the world an invention which would make further wars practically impossible.
-Orville Wright, 1917
Airpower in practice is a synthesis of political promise, theory and harsh reality. Despite the huge scale of US strategic bombing in Europe, it did not have the decisive political effects that many air theorists expected. The effect of the US "industrial web" attacks is still a matter of some dispute. While the US Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that allied bombing did have a major effect on Germany's economy, much of that effect came late in the war. This was due to lack of sufficient airpower mass, training, and precision in the early war, as well as the lack of fighter escort. In part this was also a failure of US intelligence. US planners assumed that 1941 German industry was straining significantly under the load of global war. In fact, Germany's wartime economy was not significantly mobilized until 1944.
Until that time it was relatively easy to absorb the limited scale and precision of US strategic attacks. By the time US air forces reached critical mass and achieved air superiority in mid-1944, Germany was already suffering from major strategic setbacks on the Eastern front and a breakout by allied forces in the West. It therefore becomes difficult to separate the effects of US strategic bombing from the general strategic collapse of the Third Reich in 1944 and 1945.
Airpower played a critical role in the German defeat, but did not complete the job alone.
In Japan we see a similar trend. While airpower was the critical tactical element in all of the Pacific naval campaigns, Japan showed significant resilience to strategic bombing. Japan enjoyed relative security until November of 1944, when B-29's launched their first raid from the Marianas. 33 The Japanese economy, unlike those of Europe, relied heavily on small family owned businesses to provide much of their wartime production. As a result there were fewer large industrial targets. To attack Japanese "industry" the US therefore engaged in a rather brutal policy of firebombing Japanese cities starting in the Spring of 1945. The result was the wanton taking of civilian life on an unprecedented scale. In total 330,000 civilians were killed and 8.5 million left homeless. 34 Despite repeated raids, with some more damaging that the atomic bomb, Japan did not capitulate until atomic weapons were actually used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
This resiliency of the civilian populace to strategic bombardment was another surprise of the war. Air theorists such as Douhet and Trenchard had based their projections of quick civilian surrender on the massive panic that set in after the German Zeppelin raids over England in World War I. Yet Japan did not surrender to firebombing, nor did Germany fall to the combined bomber offensive. Both were politically resilient to strategic bombing. The enemy strength can be ascribed to at least two factors. First, the US was using a raiding-logistics strategy to achieve the unlimited objective of unconditional surrender. One could argue that achieving unconditional surrender required a persistent strategy. Second, as was mentioned earlier, both Germany and Japan retained strong and tightly controlled political structures to the bitter end of the war. Neither was politically vulnerable to air attack.
A final paradox from World War II is that of the atomic bomb. Why, after enduring multiple firebomb attacks equal in scale to the atomic attacks did Japan suddenly surrender to atomic air attack? The Pacific Strategic Bombing Survey supports the idea that firebombing was having a substantial effect. In March of 1945 when firebombing began, only 19 percent of the populace believed Japan could not win the war. Just prior to surrender in August, that percentage had risen to 68 percent "of which more than one-half of the individuals interviewed credited air attacks, rather than atomic raids, as the principal reason for their beliefs." 35 The survey concludes that the atomic bomb merely accelerated the forthcoming Japanese surrender by several months, even absent a US ground invasion. Aside from firebombing, one must consider the whole of the Japanese strategic situation at the time of the atomic weapons. By the time the last atomic weapon was dropped, the bulk of the Japanese army was trapped in China, and cut off from the Japanese homeland. Nearly 250,000 Japanese troops were trapped in Manchuria alone facing near certain extinction at the hands of the newly entered Russians. US naval forces surrounded the Japanese islands, and even inter-island traffic had effectively come to a halt. The US ended the war with over 70 carriers in the Pacific to Japan's four. As an island nation with few indigenous resources, Japan faced a bleak future that included widespread starvation, total destruction of her armies, and the continued firebombing and eventual invasion of Japan itself. Add to this the demonstrated possibility of continued atomic destruction and the surrender of Japan in 1945 seems less of a paradox.
KOREA
Unlike World War II, in both Korea and Vietnam the negative political objective of limiting the scope of war prevented large-scale strategic use of airpower. Though airpower played a major role in both conflicts, its impact was primarily felt at the tactical rather than strategic level.
In addition, the vulnerability of two largely agrarian societies to strategic air attack was limited.
Korea and Vietnam did not have the large industrial Rhine valley or vast cities of Japan to attack. Strategic airpower therefore played a subsidiary role in both conflicts.
In the initial phase of the Korean War, the focus of US airpower was almost purely tactical. To a large degree, the combat-raiding strategy of the Gulf War reflected that approach. essence is a consensus organization so any strategy had to reflect the "lowest common denominator" of the nineteen member nations. In many cases all 19 nations had to approve key targets. The strategy was therefore a raiding-combat strategy, but one more like Vietnam than Desert Storm. With no ground force to tie down or identify enemy forces, the Serbians were able to easily move small units from house to house to continue their campaign against the largely defenseless Kosovar civilians. These small units were hard to identify and target from the air. Milosevic, reading NATO's slow campaign as a sign of weakness, decided to instead accelerated his process of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
Ironically, the political weakness of NATO was also its strength. The one point that all member nations were able to agree upon was that they could not lose the war. The political price of having the NATO alliance fail in its first ever military operation was higher than any of the member nations could bear. A series of public relation disasters such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy and the bombing of refugee convoys started to erode public support for the war. As public support ebbed, political leaders pressed for a quick end and the political limits were eased. In late May, General Clarke was finally given permission to take out the power grid and key national command and control centers. The shift from tactical to War. As he puts it "…war without death --to our side --is war that ceases to be real to us:
virtual war. If Western nations can employ violence with impunity, will they not be tempted to use it more often?" 40 Will we enter wars we cannot get out of? Will the ease of employing airpower result in the overextension we have seen in all great empires of the ancient world?
Only the future will tell.
CONCLUSION
But I have seen the science I worshipped, and the airplane I loved destroying the civilization I expected them to serve.
-Charles A. Lindburgh
Modern US airpower is a potent and lethal political weapon for supporting US objectives worldwide. The inherent political advantages are many including flexibility, speed, ability to project power globally, fewer friendly and collateral casualties, informational dominance and in many cases a rapid victory. Airpower also has the advantage of offering a high degree of political control. Yet airpower is not an all-purpose tool. Airmen believe airpower should be used in certain ways to achieve key military objectives, and they also believe that to use it otherwise is not only wasteful but also counterproductive.
The challenge of grand strategy is to connect the political objective to military and other means while still balancing the needs of a variety of other, often conflicting political objectives.
The politician is not as concerned with the technology or doctrine of warfare as its contribution to the grand set of competing political objectives. The politician may therefore choose to limit in various ways the employment of airpower to achieve other objectives. Airpower, by itself, also has inherent limitations. As a creation of the industrial age, airpower depends on the vulnerability of the enemy. If the enemy cannot be identified and targeted from the air, it is difficult to effectively employ airpower alone. Similarly, even if an enemy is physically vulnerable, he may not be politically vulnerable to airpower.
A survey of major US air engagements of the 20th century shows both promise and cause for caution. Though airpower played a critical role in every conflict, the role of airpower applied strategically has been mixed. When unfettered from major political restraint, airpower has created some spectacular military results, but these have not always translated directly to political results. The political vulnerability appears again to be at least as important as physical vulnerability. Translating physical vulnerability into political vulnerability from the air is not an easy task. Further, airpower appears better suited to achieving limited political objectives alone than unlimited ones. This may have to do with the inherent limitations of a non-persistent raiding strategy.
The political implications of the virtual war from the air seen in Kosovo are both breathtaking and scary. Modern airpower, if perceived by politicians as a low cost means to political ends, is remarkably cheap in its entry cost. Yet, if the last 60 years of airpower has taught us anything it is that airpower is not an all purpose solution. It can achieve many objectives alone, but it is not capable of achieving all objectives alone. That is why the US maintains a full spectrum balanced military force. The risk, then, is that we may cheaply enter a "virtual war" that turns into a much more costly real war.
Finally, as was covered earlier, even when airpower is effective it is not persistent.
Though it can be used to compel an enemy to achieve a variety of objectives, it cannot do so on a persistent basis unless it is constantly re-employed. In each of the wars mentioned above including Kosovo, substantial ground forces were required to garrison the region and maintain the peace once the air war ended. The broader use of airpower for economy may therefore have the unintended consequence of increasing, rather than decreasing the role of ground forces. If the US engages in the unrestricted use of "virtual war" to protect non-vital interests, she may be engaging in a policy of over-extension. These political objects, once achieved by military force, must be garrisoned. This would put the US on a historical path of over-extension and decline similar to that seen in formerly great empires such as Rome, Byzantium and Great
Britain.
Despite airpower's limitations, the current US advantage in airpower may indeed usher a brief period of "airpower uber alles." Nevertheless, it is clearly in the best interests of the United
States to create a balanced armed force capable of addressing the full spectrum of political objectives. Even in an ideal world, the US technological advantage cannot last forever. The proliferation of technology throughout history has shown us that eventually our enemies will match our capability. Until that happens, the application of airpower must proceed along sound political lines, with eyes fully open to potential long term military and political pitfalls.
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